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Semantically Adversarial Learnable Filters
Ali Shahin Shamsabadi, Changjae Oh, Andrea Cavallaro
Abstract—We present an adversarial framework to craft per-
turbations that mislead classifiers by accounting for the image
content and the semantics of the labels. The proposed framework
combines a structure loss and a semantic adversarial loss in
a multi-task objective function to train a fully convolutional
neural network. The structure loss helps generate perturbations
whose type and magnitude are defined by a target image
processing filter. The semantic adversarial loss considers groups
of (semantic) labels to craft perturbations that prevent the filtered
image from being classified with a label in the same group.
We validate our framework with three different target filters,
namely detail enhancement, log transformation and gamma
correction filters; and evaluate the adversarially filtered images
against three classifiers, ResNet50, ResNet18 and AlexNet, pre-
trained on ImageNet. We show that the proposed framework
generates filtered images with a high success rate, robustness,
and transferability to unseen classifiers. We also discuss objective
and subjective evaluations of the adversarial perturbations.
I. INTRODUCTION
DEEP Neural Networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to imageperturbations that are crafted to cause misclassifica-
tion [1], [2]. These adversarial perturbations can be classified
as norm-bounded or content-based. Norm-bounded perturba-
tions are characterised by a limited lp distortion, with the
aim of generating imperceptible changes [3], [4], [5], [6],
[7], [8], [9], [10]. However, this approach to craft adversar-
ial examples limits their robustness to adversarial defences
and hinder their transferability to unseen classifiers [11],
[12]. Instead, content-based perturbations, which are crafted
considering specific image properties, introduce unrestricted
intensity changes [13], [14], [15], [16], [17], [18]. Content-
based perturbations may modify colours (SemanticAdv [17],
ColorFool [13] and ACE [19]) or image structures (Edge-
Fool [14]). However, these perturbations may cause visible
distortions (e.g. unrealistic colours).
To overcome this problem, we propose to adversarially
manipulate an image while mimicking the effect of traditional
image processing filters (see Figure 1). To this end, we propose
an adversarial framework that learns to craft perturbations
using a multi-task objective function that combines a structure
loss and a semantic adversarial loss to train, end-to-end, a
fully convolutional neural network (FCNN). The structure loss
supports the learning of the properties of a target image filter
to control the structure of the perturbation. The semantic
adversarial loss accounts for pre-defined groups of labels and
prevents the classifier from predicting a label from the same
group (i.e. a semantically similar category). The proposed
framework, FilterFool, extends our previous work [14] by
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Fig. 1. Original and filtered images modified by three traditional image
processing filters and by the proposed FilterFool framework. FilterFool
accounts for the image content to produce adversarial examples that mimic
the target filter and mislead classifiers. The label shown with each image is
the corresponding ResNet50 prediction.
learning the residual of filters to generate different types of ad-
versarial enhancement. We also introduce a semantic adversar-
ial loss that improves the effectiveness of adversarial examples.
We validate FilterFool on ImageNet [20] with three classifiers,
namely ResNet50, ResNet18 [21] and AlexNet [22] using Log
transformation, Gamma correction, linear and non-linear detail
enhancement as filters. The code implementing FilterFool is
available at https://github.com/smartcameras/FilterFool.
II. PROBLEM DEFINITION
Let I be an RGB image and ŷ ∈ {1, ..., i, ...,D} its ground-
truth class. Let a D-class classifier consist of a backbone of
layers, a softmax and an argmax operation. The backbone
produces logit values for I, z = (zi)Di=1, where zi ∈ R is the
logit value associated with class i. The softmax normalises








∈ [0, 1] (1)
represents the probability of I being associated with class i and∑D
i=1 pi = 1. The argmax predicts the class y ∈ {1, ..., D}
as:
y = arg max
i=1,...,D
pi. (2)
Note that y 6= ŷ when the prediction of the classifier is
incorrect.
2
An adversarial perturbation, δ, modifies I to generate an
adversarial example, İ, as İ = I + δ so that its (adversarial)
class, ẏ ∈ {1, ..., D}, assigned by the classifier, differs from
that of I: ẏ 6= y. Traditional adversarial examples flip the
categorical label of an image disregarding the semantics of the
labels [23]. However, labels may be synonymous (e.g. screen
and television), highly granular (e.g. the ImageNet dataset [20]
includes labels for 130 breeds of dogs) [24], or may belong
to the same semantic class (e.g. the labels of the Scene365
dataset can be divided into two groups, namely private and
non-private scene [25]).
Our goal is to group the D categorical labels into S classes
and to prevent an attack from selecting a label within the
same class. Let W ∈ {0, 1}D×S be a matrix that identifies
categorical labels belonging to the same class s. In this paper,
we focus on the D = 1000 ImageNet labels and consider the
S = 11 classes generated through WordNet [24]. These classes
are dogs (containing 130 labels); other mammals (88 labels);
birds (59 labels); reptiles, fish, amphibians (60 labels); inverte-
brates (61 labels); food, plants, fungi (63 labels); devices (172
labels); structures, furnishing (90 labels); clothes, covering (92
labels); implements, containers, misc. objects (117 labels); and
vehicles (68 labels). Other scenarios include the D = 365
Scene365 labels and the S = 2 classes defining private (60
labels) or non-private (305 labels) PixelPrivacy scenes [25];
and the D = 30 Cityscape labels and S = 8 classes defined
for urban scenes: flat (4 labels), construction (6 labels), nature
(2 labels), vehicle (8 labels), sky (1 label), object (4 labels),
human (2 labels), and void (3 labels) [26].
Adversarial attacks can be untargeted or targeted. The
perturbation of an untargeted attack is crafted to simply evade
the original label, whereas the perturbation of a targeted
attack is crafted to induce the prediction of a specific label,
ẏt 6= y. In this paper, we focus on untargeted attacks, which
are normally more efficient [7] than targeted attacks, which
generally require larger distortions and longer time to craft a
perturbation that reaches the desired (adversarial) label [27].
III. BACKGROUND
In this section, we review norm-bounded attacks (FGSM [3],
BIM [4], CW [7], DeepFool [6], SparseFool [8], RP-
FGSM [28]) and content-based attacks that consider colour
(SemanticAdv [17] , ColorFool [13], ACE [19]) and structure
(EdgeFool [14]).
FGSM [3] determines whether to increase or decrease the
value of each pixel of I by defining δ = ε sign (∇IJ (I, y)),
with a small ε ∈ N based on the sign of ∇IJ(·), the gradient
of the loss function with respect to I:
İFGSM = I± δ (3)
The adversarial image generated by FGSM, İFGSM, within
the ε-neighbourhood of I, can be the untargeted attack when
İFGSM = I + δ or can be the targeted attack when İFGSM =
I − δ with selecting y as a specific label. BIM [4] extends
FGSM by iteratively generating the adversarial perturbation by
aggregating N = bmin(ε+ 4, 1.25ε)e, where b·e is a rounding






where CI,ε(·) clips the pixel intensities of the adversarial
image, İN = I ±
∑N
n=1 δn, with respect to three constant
images, E, 0 and 255, whose pixel intensities are ε, 0 and
255, respectively:




∇I+δn−1J (I + δn−1, y)
)
. (6)
Similar to FGSM, BIM can be a untargeted attack by İN =
I+
∑N
n=1 δn or an targeted attack by İN = I−
∑N
n=1 δn with
selecting y as a specific label. The iterative process helps BIM
exploit finer perturbations that improve, compared to FGSM,
the ability of the attack to mislead the classifier.
CW [7] minimises the l0, l2 or l∞ norm of the difference
between the original image, I, and the adversarial image, İ,
and the difference between the logit value, ży , of İ belonging
to the same class as I and the maximum logit value among
all the other classes:





{żi; i 6= y})
)
, (7)
where p ∈ {0, 2,∞} and cI > 0 is a constant selected via line
search which makes the computations expensive [29], [30].
DeepFool [6] iteratively generates an adversarial perturba-
tion whose l2 norm is bounded. The adversarial perturbation
at each iteration is the orthogonal projection of the adversarial
image from the previous iteration onto the closest linearised
boundary of class y in the decision space. SparseFool [8]
combines the DeepFool adversarial approach and the low mean
curvature of DNNs in the neighbourhood of each image to
perturb only a few pixels, thus resulting in sparse adversarial
perturbations with a small l1 norm.
Private FGSM (P-FGSM) [10], and its extension to multiple
classifier and seen defences RP-FGSM [28], is an iterative
norm-bounded attack that uses semantically pre-defined labels
(S = 2). P-FGSM follows the BIM’s (Eq. 4) strategy to pro-
duce adversarial images considering private and non-private
groups of labels as pre-defined semantics of the categorical
labels. P-FGSM chooses the target class randomly from a
subset of classes defined based on the prediction probability
sorted in a descending order, p′, and a threshold on the






p′i > τp, j ∈ {1, ..., D − 1}}
)
, (8)
where R(·) randomly chooses a class from the set of non-
private classes whose cumulative probability exceeds τp.
SemanticAdv [17] generates adversarially colourised images
in the HSV colour space by adding to the hue and saturation
of I a random perturbation chosen uniformly from the range of
valid values. SemanticAdv draws new perturbations until the
classifier is misled (up to 1000 attempts). The SemanticAdv








where β(·) converts I to its hue, IH , saturation, IS , and
value, IV components; [·, ·, ·] represents the channel-wise
concatenation; and δH and δS , where each component ranges
[0, 1], are the final perturbations on the hue and saturation
channels, respectively. Because IH and IS are changed by the
same amount, the colours of İSA may look unnatural.
ColorFool [13] improves the naturalness of adversarial
images compared to SemanticAdv [17] by identifying non-
sensitive and sensitive regions through semantic segmentation.
The perturbations operate on the a and b channels of the Lab
colour space: the perturbations of NS̄ non-sensitive regions
are drawn randomly from the whole range of possible values,
whereas the perturbations of NS sensitive regions are cho-
sen randomly from pre-defined natural-colour ranges, defined
















where ρ(·) is the RGB-to-Lab colour-space conversion and
Nt and N̄t are the colour perturbations of the t-th sensitive,
St, and non-sensitive, S̄t, region, respectively.
Unlike SemanticAdv and ColorFool that randomly change
the colour, Adversarial Colour Enhancement (ACE) [19] pro-
duces colourised adversarial images using a piecewise-linear
colour adjustment filter, ΓΩ(·), where Ω represents the pa-
rameters of the filter, with K pieces. Each pixel of the ACE
adversarial image, İACE, is obtained by filtering the original
image, Ix, as follows:








where s is the size of each piece. ACE learns the parameters
of the filter, Ω, by optimising the combination of the CW loss
function [7], a colour adjustment constraint on the distance be-
tween each parameter Ωi and its initial value 1K , corresponding















where ν and κ are a balance factor and size of Ω, respectively.
EdgeFool [14] generates adversarial perturbations that en-
hance the image details. EdgeFool trains a FCNN, RθEF(·),
where θEF represents all the parameters defining the FCNN,
with a multi-task loss function:
θ∗EF = arg min
θEF
(
‖RθEF(I)− Ig‖2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ls(·)




where Ls(·), the smoothing loss function, quantifies the dif-
ference between Ig , the output of a smoothing filter, and
Is = RθEF(I), the output of the FCNN. The adversarial
perturbation operates on the L channel of the Lab colour space
Original BIM DeepFool SparseFool
SemanticAdv ColorFool EdgeFool FilterFool (LT)
Fig. 2. Comparison of perturbations generated by selected adversarial
methods. To facilitate visualisation, the values are scaled between 0 and 255.
KEY – BIM: Basic Iterative Method; LT: log transformation.
TABLE I
COMPARISON OF ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS IN TERMS OF INFORMATION
USED TO CRAFT THE PERTURBATIONS (lp NORM FOR
BOUNDED-PERTURBATIONS; COL.: COLOUR INFORMATION; OBJ.:
INFORMATION ABOUT OBJECTS IN THE SCENE; STR.: INFORMATION
ABOUT STRUCTURES IN THE IMAGE) AND CONSIDERATION OF SEMANTIC
(SEM.) RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CLASSES.












by enhancing the image details, Id = I−Is, using the sigmoid
function, f(a, b) =
(
1 + e−ab


















where the input to the sigmoid is normalised by the maximum
value of the L channel (i.e. 100), and v1, v2 and v3 are
constants that adjust the midpoint and slope of the sigmoid.
The second term in Eq. 13 guides the FCNN to smooth the








Figure 2 compares sample perturbations generated by norm-
bounded and content-based methods. It is possible to notice
that the adversarial perturbations of BIM, DeepFool and
SparseFool are unrelated to the content, whereas SemanticAdv
modifies the colours of the whole image, ColorFool focuses
on specific regions identified through semantic segmentation,
and EdgeFool and FilterFool craft perturbations that relate to
the structures in the image.
Finally, Table I summarises the adversarial attacks discussed
in this section and compares them with the proposed frame-












Fig. 3. Block diagram of the proposed framework, FilterFool, which integrates
a traditional image processing filter with a Fully Convolutional Neural
Network (FCNN) to output adversarial images that mislead a classifier with
(adversarial) classes ẏ that are semantically different from the original classes
(i.e. class predicted by the classifier for the original image, y). During
training, the errors measured by LStr and LS-Adv are backpropagated through
the path indicated with to optimise the parameters of FCNN. The Backbone
represents all parts of the classifier before the Softmax layer. KEY – I input
image; Ie: filtered image; δ: adversarial perturbation; LStr: structure loss,
which is the distance between the enhancement perturbation, δe = Ie−I, and
the learned adversarial perturbation, δ; W matrix that defines the mapping




We aim to generate adversarial perturbations that mimic
the output of an image processing filter. To this end, we
approximate the target filter with a DNN [32] and, specifically,
with a Fully Convolutional Neural Network (FCNN), which
learns to produce perturbations that resemble that of an image
filter. The parameters of the FCNN are optimised with a
multi-objective loss: the structure loss, which accounts for the
difference between the intensity changes introduced by the
filter and the learned perturbation, and an adversarial loss,
which induces misclassification by operating on pre-defined
groups of labels.
Figure 3 shows the block diagram of FilterFool, a general
framework to learn to generate adversarial images that re-
semble those obtained with an image processing filter. Given
an image I, the target filter produces Ie. The FCNN learns
an adversarial perturbation, δ, by optimising the structure
loss, LStr(·, ·), which represents the error between the in-
tensity changes produced by the target filter, δe = Ie − I,
and the learned adversarial perturbation, δ. The semantic
adversarial loss, LS-Adv(·, ·), causes the adversarial image, İ,
to be misclassified as class ẏ that is not only categorically
(y 6= ẏ) but also semantically different from that of the original
class, y. The errors measured by LStr(·, ·) and LS-Adv(·, ·) are
backpropagated to determine the parameters of the FCNN.
In the rest of this section, we describe the details of
structure loss LStr, the semantic adversarial loss LS-Adv and
the combined multi-task loss used for training the FCNN.
B. Structure loss
We use residual learning to generate intensity changes for
the original image, I, to produce the desired filtered image, Ie.
We measure the difference between the residual, δe = Ie − I,
and the adversarial perturbation, δ, which is the output of the
FCNN. To tailor the perturbation towards the output of the
Original GC, γ = 0.5 GC, γ = 1.5 LT
LD, α = 0.1 LD, α = 0.5 ND
Fig. 4. Sample images filtered by gamma correction (GC, with strength γ),
log transformation (LT), linear detail enhancement (LD, with strength α) and
nonlinear detail enhancement (ND).
target filter, we define Ll2(·, ·), which penalises the squared
error between δ and δe:
Ll2(δ, δe) = ‖δ − δe‖2. (16)
As using Ll2(·, ·) alone may cause artefacts in untextured
regions [33], we consider another loss that accounts for
structures in the image:
LSSIM(δ, δe) = 1− SSIM(δ, δe), (17)
which is based on the Structural SIMilarity (SSIM) index [34]:
SSIM(δ, δe) = l(δ, δe) · c(δ, δe) · s(δ, δe), (18)








where µδ = 1M
∑M
i=1 δi and δi is the intensity of i-th element
of the image (including the three colour planes) and hence M
















. The structure infor-










i=1(δi − µδ)(δi − µδe); and c1,
c2 and c3 are small constants that stabilise the division.
SSIM(δ, δe) ∈ [0, 1], and the closer to 1, the higher the
similarity.
The structure loss, LStr(·, ·), combines the two losses as
LStr(δ, δe) = Ll2(δ, δe) + ηLSSIM(δ, δe), (22)
where the hyper-parameter η is determined empirically.
For the specific implementation of this paper, we consider
four filters, namely linear and non-linear detail enhancement,
log transformation and gamma correction (see Figure 4). For
linear detail enhancement, we use an l0 structure-preserving
smoothing filter [35], which linearly scales the image details,
Id, obtained by the difference between the original and the
5





































Fig. 5. Logit values generated by ResNet50 for an original image (top) and
for adversarial image (bottom) generated with the semantic adversarial loss.
This loss minimises the positive logits of the labels that are semantically
similar to the original label (e.g. dogs) and increases the logit of a label
that belongs to a different class. The horizontal axis represents the labels
and colours represent the classes: dogs, other mammals, birds, reptiles,fish,
amphibians, invertebrates, food, plants, fungi, devices, structures, furnishing,
clothes, covering, implements, containers, misc. objects, vehicles.
output of an l0 smoothing filter, as Ie = I + αId, where α ∈
(0, 10]. For non-linear detail enhancement, we enhance image
details in the Lab colour space with a sigmoid, following [31]
and similarly to EdgeFool (see Eq. 15). The log transformation
expands darker pixel values and compresses brighter pixel
values [36]. Finally, the exponent 1/γ of gamma correction
darkens (γ < 1) or brightens (γ > 1) the image [36].
C. Semantic adversarial loss
We aim to devise an adversarial loss that operates on the
groups of labels defined by W (see Sec. II). To this end, we
adapt the CW adversarial loss [7] and decrease the logits for
the labels that share the same class s with the label of the
original image.
Let ws ∈ {0, 1}D be the column of W that identifies the
mapping of the labels to class s. We apply a ReLU to the
adversarial logit, ż, and compute the dot product, 〈·, ·〉, with
ws to focus the same-class loss, LSam(·, ·), on the positive
logits with the class s:
LSam(İ, I) = 〈ReLU(ż),ws〉. (23)
In each training iteration, we select the largest logit of
a label not belonging to class s using a different-class loss
LDiff(·, ·):
LDiff(İ, I) = max(ż ŵs), (24)
where ŵs = 1 − ws represents all the labels whose class
differs from that of y, 1 = {1}D and  is the Hadamard
product.
The semantic adversarial loss, LS-Adv(·, ·), combines the
same-class and different-class losses as:
LS-Adv(İ, I) = LSam(İ, I)− LDiff(İ, I). (25)
Figure 5 shows an example of logit values for the ImageNet
labels before and after using this semantic adversarial loss.





















Fig. 6. Comparison between the ResNet50 attention map on an original image
and on three FilterFool examples, with the corresponding Top5 predictions.
The colour of the heatmap ranging from blue to red indicates the importance
of each image region (blue: least important; red: most important) in predicting
the Top1 image label.
D. Multi-task loss
We define our objective function, L, as the combination
of the structure loss, LStr, and the semantic adversarial loss,
LS-Adv:
L = LStr(δ, δe) + LS-Adv(İ, I). (26)
During the iterative process that generates the perturbation,
the FCNN learns to craft δ by backpropagating both LStr
and LS-Adv until İ misleads the classifier and LStr < τ
(empirically set such that the adversarial image resembles an
image enhanced with the target filter) or a maximum number
of iterations is reached (3,000 in our case).
Figure 6 shows the Gradient-weighted Class Activation
Maps (Grad-CAM) [37] of sample images alongside their
Top5 predicted labels by ResNet50. Grad-CAM determines the
importance of each neuron in a layer for the predicted Top1
label and the corresponding heatmap of the last convolutional
layer is computed as weighted sum of the neuron activations
multiplied by their importance, followed by up-sampling to
the original image size. It is possible to notice that in the
original image ResNet50 focuses on the head, whereas in the
FilterFool images the focus is reduced in the face region (ND,
LT) or shifted towards another part of the image (LD).
V. PERFORMANCE MEASURES
We evaluate adversarial attacks based on three main proper-
ties, namely effectiveness, robustness and transferability [38].
Effectiveness (or success rate) is the degree to which the
adversarial attack succeeds in misleading the classifier. Effec-
tiveness can be measured as the accuracy of the classifier over
a dataset. The lower the accuracy, the higher the effectiveness
of the attack.
We measure effectiveness as categorical (label-level) and
semantic (class-level) success rates. We also consider the
TopK success rate and, because of the study in this paper
focuses on ImageNet semantic labels, we also use the so called
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semantic damage [23]. The semantic damage is the average
Wu-Palmar word similarity [39], Wu(·, ·), across the dataset.
A damage occurs when the similarity between the original




1 Wu(λ, λ̇) < Ts
0 otherwise.
(27)
where Wub is the binarised word similarity based on Ts.
Robustness is the effectiveness of an adversarial attack in the
presence of a defence (e.g. median filtering, re-quantization,
JPEG compression) that aims to remove the effect of a
(potential) perturbation before the image is analysed by the
classifier [40]. Robustness can be measured as the difference in
accuracy of the classifier over a target dataset when a defence
is used with respect to a setting when the defence is not used.
The smaller this difference, the higher the robustness of the
attack. A special case of defence is adversarial training, when
the classifier itself is retrained with adversarial examples to
increase its robustness [41].
Finally, transferability is the extent to which a perturbation
crafted for a classifier is effective in misleading another
classifier. Transferability can be measured as the difference
in accuracy between the two classifiers over a target dataset.




For the evaluation, we consider the following adversarial
attacks: Basic Iterative Method (BIM) [4], DeepFool [6],
SparseFool [8], SemanticAdv [17], ColorFool [13], Edge-
Fool [14], least-likely targeted [4] and private targeted [10]
FGSM and BIM. As classifiers we use ResNet with 50 layers
(ResNet50) and 18 layers (ResNet18) [21], and AlexNet [22])
trained for the image classification task on ImageNet [20],
which includes D = 1, 000 classes. We use the same 3,000
images (3 images per class) that are randomly selected from
the validation set by [13], [14]. We consider S = 11 WordNet
semantic classes [24].
The dimensions of I are 224×224×3. We instantiate FCNN
with the architecture of [42], which consists of 7 convolution
layers with 24 intermediate feature maps and 3 × 3 kernels.
The last convolution layer applies a 1 × 1 convolution that
generates Is. The dilation factor of each layer is set to 1, 2, 4,
8, 16, 32, 1, and 1, respectively. A leaky rectified linear unit
is applied after padding and normalising each intermediate
convolutional layer, except the last one. The hyper-parameter
η = 0.01 is chosen empirically to balance the errors of
Ll2 and LSSIM on the structure loss as L SSIM is bigger than
Ll2 . Note that the hyper-parameter can affect the number of
iterations needed to craft the perturbations. The structure loss
and the semantic adversarial loss have equal contribution in
the training. Important components of our optimisation process
are the choice of the stopping criteria applied to the structure
loss and the semantic adversarial loss. The stopping threshold
τ is set 0.04, 0.003 and 0.0005 for detail enhancement, log
TABLE II
SIMILARITY OF THE FILTERFOOL ADVERSARIAL IMAGES AND
PERTURBATIONS AND THEIR CORRESPONDING TRADITIONALLY FILTERED
IMAGES AND PIXEL CHANGES.
Attack Model SSIMAdv. images Adv. perturbation
FF (ND)
R50 0.98± 0.02 0.97± 0.02
R18 0.98± 0.01 0.97± 0.01
A 0.97± 0.02 0.96± 0.02
FF (Log)
R50 0.99± 0.01 0.99± 0.00
R18 0.99± 0.01 0.99± 0.00
A 0.98± 0.02 0.98± 0.02
FF (LD1)
R50 0.99± 0.01 0.99± 0.00
R18 0.99± 0.01 0.99± 0.00
A 0.98± 0.02 0.99± 0.01
FF (GC.5)
R50 0.99± 0.02 1.00± 0.01
R18 0.99± 0.02 1.00± 0.01
A 0.98± 0.02 0.99± 0.01
transformation and gamma correction, respectively. For linear
detail enhancement and gamma correction, α and γ range
from 0.1 to 10. The parameters of the sigmoid in nonlinear
detail enhancement are [31], [14]: v1 = 56, v2 = 1, and
v3 = 15. The parameters for bit reduction and median
smoothing are [40]: 1 to 7 bits per colour channel in steps
of 1; kernel of 2 × 2, 3 × 3 and 5 × 5 (the median values
in odd and even kernels are the middle ones and the mean of
two middle ones, respectively). The quality parameters we use
for JPEG are 25, 50, 75 and 100. As an adversarially trained
classifier, we use ResNet50 re-trained on adversarial images
crafted with BIM [41].
B. FilterFool and traditional filters
Figure 7 shows the categorical and semantic success rates
of FilterFool and the target filters. As the filter effect becomes
stronger, the success rates of Gamma correction and linear
detail enhancement in traditional filters increase. However,
the traditional filters have lower success rates than FilterFool,
as expected. For example, the success rates of Log trans-
formation, non-linear detail enhancement, Gamma correction
(γ = 5) and linear detail enhancement (α = 5) in misleading
ResNet50 are 6%, 29%, 39% and 51%, respectively. FilterFool
is successful in misleading ResNet50, ResNet18 and AlexNet
with any strength of filters.
We use both objective and subjective evaluations to measure
the differences between the FilterFool adversarial images and
the target filtered images. As objective evaluation, we measure
the SSIM between FilterFool and traditionally filtered images
(see Table II). Because the adversarial perturbation of Filter-
Fool is produced based on the structure loss function in Eq. 22,
the SSIM values show that the outputs of FilterFool and the
corresponding target filter are highly similar. The structure-
aware, small and adversarially guided differences between the
FilterFool adversarial images and the target filtered images
enable FilterFool to mislead classifiers with high success rates.
We assessed the similarity of the FilterFool images with a
panel of observers (Queen Mary Ethics of Research Com-
mittee reference number: QMERC20.452). We considered
all four filters: linear detail enhancement (α = 1), non-
linear detail enhancement, Log transformation and Gamma
7




















































































Fig. 7. Comparing the categorical (C) and semantic (S) success rates of
FilterFool ( or ) with its corresponding traditional filters ( or ):
Nonlinear Detail enhancement (ND), Log Transformation (LT), Gamma
Correction (GC), Linear Detail enhancement (LD) with strengths varying from
0.1 to 10 on the ImageNet dataset against ResNet50, ResNet18 and AlexNet.
correction (γ = 0.5). We first ranked the 3,000 output images
from FilterFool based on their SSIM values with respect to the
filtered images and then divided the images into three groups,
namely low, middle, and high SSIM values (the average and
standard deviation of SSIM values are reported in Table II).
Next, we randomly chose 5 images from each group to
obtain a total of 15 images for each filter. Next 33 human
subjects were shown a pair of images from FilterFool and the
corresponding target filter with an original image, and asked:
Are there any differences between these two filtered images?
Each pair of images was shown for 7 seconds, after which the
answer (Yes or No) was provided. We randomised the display
order of the image pairs and used the Mean Opinion Score
(MOS) to quantify the percentage of answers that perceive no
differences between the FilterFool adversarial images and the
target filtered images. The resulting MOS is 83.41 ± 9.83%,
which suggests a high fidelity by FilterFool in mimicking the
target filters.
Figure 8 shows the effect of different filters used in Fil-
terFool and the influence of their strengths on the categorical
success rate and transferability. In each plot, the two top lines
(or points) are the categorical success rate against the classifier
that was used to generate the adversarial images. Four bottom
lines (or points) show the categorical transferability to un-
seen classifiers. FilterFool achieves a high categorical success
rate for all three classifiers. As expected, the transferability
increases with the strength of the filtering effect [17], [13].
We also consider here FilterFool-c, the categorical version of
FilterFool, for which each categorical label is considered as a
class on its own, i.e. S = D and hence LS-Adv(·, ·) becomes
the adversarial CW loss. The use of the semantic adversarial














































































































Fig. 8. The categorical success rate and transferability of FilterFool
( or ) and FilterFool-c ( or ) to evaluate the effect of type and
strength of selected filters, namely Nonlinear Detail enhancement (ND), Log
Transformation (LT), Gamma Correction (GC) with strength γ and Linear
Detail enhancement (LD) with strength α, as well as the proposed semantic
adversarial loss function. Adversarial images are generated against ResNet50,
ResNet18 and AlexNet in the first, second and third rows, respectively. Hence,
in each plot, the top two overlapped lines (or points) show the categorical
success rate when the classifier is seen, while other four bottom lines (or
points) show the transferability against unseen classifiers. Note that γ = 1 in
the Gamma correction plots corresponds to the original images.
loss improves the categorical transferability by 8%, as unseen
classifiers may misclassify an image to a categorically different
label which is, however, semantically similar.
Figure 9 shows the impact of the filters in FilterFool on the
robustness against defences. Coloured regions represent the
range of categorical success rate in the presence of various
parameters of bit reduction, median filtering and JPEG com-
pression, which are defined in Sec. VI-A. As for transferability,
from the coloured region covered by linear detail enhancement
and gamma correction, the robustness improves with the
strength of filters. FilterFool is more robust than FilterFool-c
as the semantic adversarial loss reduces the group of logits
that are sematically related to the predicted label.
C. Comparisons
The tables in this section show the success rate on on-
diagonal elements of each sub-table and the transferability on
off-diagonal elements of each sub-table. The second column
of each table shows the classifiers used to craft the adversarial
images, whereas the first row shows the classifiers (with →)
used for testing.
Table III reports the categorical success rate and the trans-
ferability of several state-of-the-art adversarial attacks. Lim-
iting the lp norm of adversarial perturbations also limits the
8

























































































































































































































































Fig. 9. Robustness of FilterFool-c and FilterFool to defence frameworks. The
coloured areas are the categorical success rate of FilterFool-c and FilterFool
in the presence of the defence frameworks that use (1-7) bit reduction, (2,3,5)
median smoothing and (25,50,75,100) JPEG compression against ResNet50
(R50), ResNet18 (R18) and AlexNet (AN) for all four filters; Nonlinear
Detail enhancement (ND), Log Transformation (LT), Gamma Correction
(GC), Linear Detail enhancement (LD) with different strengths. γ and α are
the strengths of GC and LD that range from 0.1 to 10.
categorical transferability of adversarial images. For example,
although DeepFool adversarial images on ResNet50 achieve
98.3% categorical success rate, only 7.1% and 1.8% of them
TABLE III
CATEGORICAL SUCCESS RATE AND TRANSFERABILITY ON IMAGENET.
Attack Classifier →ResNet50 →ResNet18 →AlexNet
BIM [4]
ResNet50 1.000 0.127 0.037
ResNet18 0.109 1.000 0.041
AlexNet 0.038 0.050 1.000
LL-FGSM [4]
ResNet50 0.850 0.483 0.414
ResNet18 0.418 0.966 0.434
AlexNet 0.266 0.362 0.993
LL-BIM [4]
ResNet50 1.000 0.173 0.097
ResNet18 0.129 1.000 0.100
AlexNet 0.117 0.153 0.998
P-FGSM [10]
ResNet50 1.000 0.233 0.172
ResNet18 0.203 1.000 0.183
AlexNet 0.151 0.189 1.000
DeepFool [6]
ResNet50 0.983 0.071 0.018
ResNet18 0.055 0.991 0.017
AlexNet 0.019 0.031 0.967
SparseFool [8]
ResNet50 0.990 0.167 0.176
ResNet18 0.086 0.997 0.134
AlexNet 0.062 0.079 1.000
SemanticAdv [17]
ResNet50 0.890 0.540 0.770
ResNet18 0.422 0.931 0.757
AlexNet 0.359 0.431 0.994
ColorFool [13]
ResNet50 0.917 0.346 0.592
ResNet18 0.223 0.934 0.541
AlexNet 0.114 0.147 0.995
EdgeFool [14]
ResNet50 0.981 0.357 0.512
ResNet18 0.278 0.989 0.510
AlexNet 0.272 0.333 0.995
FilterFool (LT)
ResNet50 1.000 0.168 0.175
ResNet18 0.146 1.000 0.191
AlexNet 0.154 0.205 1.000
FilterFool (ND)
ResNet50 1.000 0.407 0.523
ResNet18 0.331 1.000 0.532
AlexNet 0.324 0.403 1.000
FilterFool (GC)
ResNet50 0.999 0.292 0.402
ResNet18 0.237 1.000 0.414
0.5 AlexNet 0.237 0.303 1.000
FilterFool (LD)
ResNet50 1.000 0.303 0.402
ResNet18 0.245 1.000 0.402
1.0 AlexNet 0.237 0.316 1.000
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Fig. 10. SSIM, l2 and l∞ values and categorical success rate of BIM ,
DeepFool , SparseFool , SemanticAdv , ColorFool , EdgeFool , FilterFool
(ND) , FilterFool (LD1) , FilterFool (Log) , FilterFool (GC.5) , Traditional
filter (GC.5) , Traditional filter (ND) , Traditional filter (LD1) and Tradi-
tional filter (Log) .
are transferable to ResNet18 and AlexNet, respectively.
Next, we relate the magnitude of the perturbations to their
categorical success rate. Figure 10 shows the categorical
success rate of adversarial images with respect to their SSIM,
l2 and l∞. The l∞ of SparseFool is the biggest as SparseFool
perturbs a few pixels but with a large magnitude. BIM changes
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TABLE IV
SEMANTIC SUCCESS RATE AND TRANSFERABILITY ON IMAGENET.
Attack Classifier →ResNet50 →ResNet18 →AlexNet
BIM [4]
ResNet50 0.405 0.052 0.015
ResNet18 0.045 0.425 0.019
AlexNet 0.015 0.021 0.480
LL-FGSM [4]
ResNet50 0.526 0.244 0.211
ResNet18 0.217 0.727 0.225
AlexNet 0.122 0.179 0.823
LL-BIM [4]
ResNet50 0.969 0.112 0.078
ResNet18 0.095 0.975 0.088
AlexNet 0.074 0.085 0.973
P-FGSM [10]
ResNet50 0.898 0.103 0.083
ResNet18 0.095 0.890 0.084
AlexNet 0.070 0.086 0.897
DeepFool [6]
ResNet50 0.358 0.030 0.009
ResNet18 0.023 0.384 0.008
AlexNet 0.006 0.012 0.413
SparseFool [8]
ResNet50 0.390 0.073 0.087
ResNet18 0.034 0.408 0.065
AlexNet 0.024 0.030 0.441
SemanticAdv [17]
ResNet50 0.406 0.274 0.496
ResNet18 0.198 0.442 0.472
AlexNet 0.169 0.209 0.563
ColorFool [13]
ResNet50 0.400 0.170 0.380
ResNet18 0.100 0.426 0.331
AlexNet 0.048 0.062 0.476
EdgeFool [14]
ResNet50 0.374 0.165 0.273
ResNet18 0.126 0.407 0.262
AlexNet 0.119 0.149 0.483
TABLE V
SEMANTIC SUCCESS RATE AND TRANSFERABILITY OF FILTERFOOL ON
IMAGENET.
Attack Classifier →ResNet50 →ResNet18 →AlexNet
FilterFool (LT)
ResNet50 1.000 0.085 0.082
ResNet18 0.069 1.000 0.093
AlexNet 0.065 0.094 1.000
FilterFool (ND)
ResNet50 1.000 0.221 0.287
ResNet18 0.173 1.000 0.299
AlexNet 0.148 0.204 1.000
FilterFool (GC)
ResNet50 0.999 0.149 0.206
ResNet18 0.118 1.000 0.211
0.5 AlexNet 0.111 0.145 1.000
FilterFool (LD)
ResNet50 1.000 0.153 0.209
ResNet18 0.121 1.000 0.212
1.0 AlexNet 0.103 0.151 1.000
all the pixels controls the maximum change of each pixel,
thus resulting in the smallest l∞. DeepFool has the smallest
l2 norm, which indeed it minimises. DeepFool, SparseFool,
FilterFool (Log) and BIM achieve the highest SSIM values of
1, 0.98, 0.97 and 0.95, respectively.
The magnitude of content-based perturbations are larger
than thos of norm-bounded perturbations. The standard de-
viation of the magnitudes of the perturbations generated by
ColorFool and SemanticAdv are bigger than those of content-
based perturbations (5× FilterFool’s), as their perturbations
are chosen randomly from a range that gradually increases
until the misleading property is satisfied. FilterFool and the
corresponding target filter achieve similar SSIM and l2 values
with respect to the original images. In addition to mimicking
the effect of filters, FilterFool can achieve high categorical
success rate. For example, the SSIM values of both FilterFool
(Log) and Traditional filter (Log) are .97, while the success
BIM [4] DeepFool [6] SparseFool [8]
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Fig. 11. Confusion matrices showing the success rate of adversarial attacks per
semantic class against ResNet50. Rows and columns show the semantic class
of the original and adversarial images, namely Dogs (s1), other mammals
(s2), Bird (s3), Reptiles, fish, amphibians (s4), Invertebrates (s5), Food,
plants, fungi (s6), Devices (s7), Structures, furnishing (s8), Clothes, covering
(s9), Implements, containers, misc. objects (s10), Vehicles (s11) generated
by BIM, LL-BIM, LL-FGSM, P-FGSM, DeepFool, SparseFool, EdgeFool,
SemanticAdv, ColorFool, Nonlinear Detail enhancement (ND) of traditional
Trad. filter, ND of FilterFool-c, and ND of FilterFool. The on-diagonal
elements of the matrices show that ResNet50 is still able to classify adversarial
images of state-of-the-art adversarial attacks, Filter and FilterFool-c with





































Fig. 12. Semantic damage incurred by Basic Iterative method (BI), least-
likely BI (l-BI), least-likely Fast Gradient Sign Method (l-FG), Private BI
(P-BI), DeepFool (DF), SparseFool (SF), EdgeFool (EF), SemanticAdv (SA),
ColorFool (CF), Nonlinear detail enhancement of FilterFool-c (FF-c) and
FilterFool (FF) using three values for Ts: 0.3 , 0.5 and 0.7 against
ResNet50 and AlexNet trained on the ImageNet dataset. Note that ResNet18
results are similar to ResNet50 results. For each pair of original and adversarial
image, the semantic damage is 1 only when the semantic similarity, measured
by the word similarity metric (Eq. 27), between the adversarial class and
original class is less than the chosen Ts.
rate of the former is 100% and the latter is only 6%. In general,
l2 and l∞ of FilterFool and traditional filters are larger than
lp norm-bounded attacks and smaller than other content-based
10





































Fig. 13. TopK categorical success rate (SR) of BIM , LL-BIM ,
LL-FGSM , P-FGSM , DeepFool , SparseFool , Edge-
Fool , SemanticAdv , ColorFool , Nonlinear detail enhance-
ment of FilterFool-c and FilterFool against ResNet50 and AlexNet
trained on ImageNet. ResNet18 results are similar to ResNet50 results.
attacks, e.g. ColorFool and SemanticAdv.
Table IV shows the semantic success rate and transferability
of state-of-the-art attacks. The predicted classes of more than
50% of untargeted adversarial images generated by each state-
of-the-art attack are semantically similar to the predicted
classes of their corresponding original images. While the
semantic success rate of LL-FGSM is low, LL-BIM is highly
effective in pushing adversarial images to reach the least-likely
class, thus resulting in more than 97% semantic success rate,
as not all the least-likely classes are semantically different than
the original class.
Table V compares the semantic success rate and transfer-
ability of FilterFool. In general, the semantic transferability of
adversarial attacks is lower than the categorical transferability.
Hence, improving the semantic transferability of adversarial
attacks is an important direction for future research.
Figure 11 visualises the confusion matrix of the semantic
success rate for original and adversarial classes. It is possible
to note, for example, that 336, 352, 342, 351, 319, 317 of
the adversarial images generated by BIM, DeepFool, Sparse-
Fool, EdgeFool, SemanticAdv and ColorFool, respectively,
for (original) 390 dog images are misclassified as another
breed of dogs. Note also that the 50% semantic success rates
of the state-of-the-art attacks reported in Table III are due
to confusion between devices and containers. Moreover, we
observe the effect of the adversarial loss and the semantic
adversarial loss by comparing the confusion matrix of the
traditional filter, FilterFool-c, FilterFool with nonlinear detail
enhancement. The results of traditional filter mostly falls on
the diagonal because of the low success rate.
Figure 12 compares the semantic damage for three values
of the similarity threshold. FilterFool, least-likely and private
attacks inflict greater semantic damage on classifiers than other
untargeted attacks as their adversarial labels are semantically
different from the original labels.
Figure 13 shows the TopK categorical success rate of the
attacks. The categorical success rate of untargeted attacks sub-
stantially decreases as K increases, since untargeted attacks
mostly shift the original label from the most probable one to

























Fig. 14. TopK semantic success rate (SR) of least-likely FGSM , least-
likely BIM and P-FGSM with Log transformation , Gamma
correction (γ = 0.5 ), nonlinear detail enhancement and linear
detail enhancement (α = 1 ) of FilterFool using ResNet50 and AlexNet
trained on ImageNet. ResNet18 results are similar to ResNet50 results.
TABLE VI
TOP1 AND TOP5 CLASSIFICATION ACCURACY (↓) WITH RESPECT TO THE
CATEGORICAL LABELS. RESNET50, RESNET18 AND ALEXNET ARE
EVALUATED ON THE ORIGINAL AND ADVERSARIAL IMAGES.
Images ResNet50 ResNet18 AlexNetTop1 Top5 Top1 Top5 Top1 Top5
Original 0.726 0.906 0.650 0.868 0.517 0.753
BIM [4] 0.082 0.482 0.091 0.388 0.094 0.431
LL-FGSM [4] 0.149 0.297 0.035 0.090 0.010 0.035
LL-BIM [4] 0.001 0.010 0.001 0.006 0.003 0.006
P-FGSM [10] 0.000 0.062 0.000 0.044 0.001 0.027
DeepFool [6] 0.115 0.693 0.109 0.618 0.140 0.641
SparseFool [8] 0.097 0.899 0.097 0.843 0.106 0.716
SemanticAdv [17] 0.156 0.760 0.117 0.705 0.057 0.452
ColorFool [13] 0.160 0.872 0.141 0.827 0.106 0.707
EdgeFool [14] 0.085 0.840 0.079 0.784 0.073 0.613
FilterFool-c (ND) 0.085 0.814 0.086 0.767 0.084 0.607
FilterFool (ND) 0.006 0.026 0.004 0.024 0.004 0.012
another one with high probability. This results in, for instance,
the decreased success rate of DeepFool from 98% with K = 1
to 35% with K = 5. The least-likely targeted attack and
FilterFool maintain high success rate even for K = 100 as
a consequence of targeting semantically different classes and
the proposed semantic adversarial loss function, respectively.
For example, the TopK categorical success rate of FilterFool
only drops to 73%, 80% and 93% for ResNet50, ResNet18 and
AlexNet, respectively, when the K changes from 1 to 100.
Furthermore, Figure 14 compares the TopK semantic success
rate of FilterFool and targeted attacks. The TopK semantic
success rate of FilterFool and the least-likely attacks decreases
as K increases. However, this drop is higher in least-likely
targeted attacks than FilterFool, as FilterFool performs on a
group of labels as opposed to one label considered in targeted
attacks. For example, Top1, Top5 and Top10 semantic success
rates of LL-BIM is 95%, 75% and 58%, while 100%, 97%
and 95% for FilterFool with detail enhancement (α = 1).
Table VI shows the Top1 and Top5 accuracy of ResNet50,
ResNet18, AlexNet on the original and adversarial images.
Most of the attacks achieve low Top1 accuracy, but those of un-
targeted attacks with the categorical adversarial loss show high
Top5 accuracy. The targeted attacks with the least-likey label,
LL-FGSM and LL-BIM, can avoid this performance decrease
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TABLE VII
ROBUSTNESS (↑) OF IMAGES GENERATED WITH VARIOUS ATTACKS: BIM, LL-BIM, LL-FGSM, P-FGSM, DEEPFOOL (DF), SPARSEFOOL (SF),
SEMANTICADV (SA), COLORFOOL (CF) AND VARIOUS VERSION OF FILTERFOOL (FF) – LINEAR WITH α = 1 AND NONLINEAR DETAIL
ENHANCEMENT (LD) AND (ND), LOG TRANSFORMATION (LT) AND GAMMA CORRECTION WITH γ = 0.5 (GC) – ON IMAGENET FOR RESNET50
(R50), RESNET18 (R18) AND ALEXNET (A).
Method Model Bit reduction Median smoothing JPEG compression1-bit 2-bit 3-bit 4-bit 5-bit 6-bit 7-bit 2× 2 3× 3 5× 5 q-25 q-50 q-75 q-100
BIM [4]
R50 0.933 0.622 0.527 0.687 0.809 0.859 0.870 0.509 0.465 0.462 0.381 0.402 0.504 0.837
R18 0.951 0.702 0.697 0.832 0.911 0.935 0.945 0.663 0.591 0.553 0.466 0.533 0.686 0.936
A 0.927 0.780 0.784 0.880 0.924 0.939 0.943 0.649 0.656 0.663 0.569 0.653 0.771 0.927
LL-BIM [4]
R50 0.939 0.648 0.613 0.952 0.999 1.000 1.000 0.568 0.468 0.477 0.370 0.375 0.453 0.997
R18 0.952 0.760 0.798 0.991 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.687 0.579 0.564 0.459 0.473 0.667 1.000
A 0.946 0.905 0.962 0.995 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.806 0.830 0.751 0.598 0.747 0.918 0.995
P-FGSM [10]
R50 0.938 0.636 0.601 0.972 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.559 0.443 0.462 0.368 0.342 0.429 0.998
R18 0.953 0.731 0.818 0.995 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.706 0.563 0.529 0.432 0.434 0.694 1.000
A 0.942 0.873 0.973 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.814 0.801 0.722 0.573 0.771 0.960 1.000
LL-FGSM [4]
R50 0.947 0.760 0.790 0.830 0.846 0.850 0.850 0.719 0.688 0.650 0.573 0.682 0.758 0.839
R18 0.965 0.897 0.930 0.961 0.965 0.965 0.966 0.864 0.846 0.781 0.754 0.867 0.927 0.961
A 0.960 0.959 0.982 0.988 0.992 0.992 0.992 0.943 0.943 0.896 0.912 0.959 0.979 0.989
DF [6]
R50 0.937 0.625 0.371 0.329 0.345 0.357 0.362 0.304 0.342 0.412 0.348 0.377 0.362 0.364
R18 0.953 0.683 0.465 0.455 0.481 0.495 0.499 0.388 0.399 0.481 0.426 0.466 0.488 0.499
A 0.922 0.733 0.553 0.584 0.605 0.614 0.614 0.431 0.506 0.602 0.472 0.527 0.600 0.600
SF [8]
R50 0.941 0.619 0.386 0.346 0.422 0.548 0.714 0.180 0.226 0.372 0.363 0.312 0.293 0.328
R18 0.956 0.690 0.455 0.403 0.497 0.638 0.786 0.210 0.280 0.432 0.423 0.358 0.333 0.397
A 0.929 0.783 0.650 0.719 0.831 0.911 0.959 0.382 0.462 0.605 0.502 0.477 0.521 0.698
SA [17]
R50 0.958 0.809 0.701 0.716 0.768 0.830 0.866 0.652 0.697 0.783 0.676 0.662 0.667 0.737
R18 0.975 0.873 0.783 0.787 0.835 0.875 0.909 0.715 0.754 0.813 0.730 0.712 0.712 0.782
A 0.971 0.923 0.903 0.919 0.949 0.977 0.987 0.869 0.888 0.922 0.840 0.846 0.869 0.914
CF [13]
R50 0.946 0.785 0.654 0.618 0.675 0.763 0.831 0.546 0.622 0.740 0.664 0.607 0.606 0.614
R18 0.967 0.824 0.686 0.642 0.683 0.768 0.843 0.609 0.667 0.771 0.684 0.637 0.613 0.617
A 0.951 0.861 0.761 0.743 0.808 0.888 0.929 0.684 0.740 0.828 0.732 0.693 0.703 0.735
EF [14]
R50 0.950 0.610 0.560 0.640 0.806 0.917 0.966 0.397 0.433 0.490 0.516 0.512 0.519 0.691
R18 0.963 0.677 0.633 0.723 0.861 0.942 0.975 0.461 0.483 0.545 0.581 0.563 0.586 0.756
A 0.929 0.819 0.820 0.904 0.959 0.981 0.990 0.585 0.598 0.628 0.714 0.749 0.795 0.888
FF (ND)
R50 0.953 0.642 0.667 0.880 0.986 0.999 1.000 0.474 0.485 0.520 0.507 0.541 0.621 0.990
R18 0.967 0.735 0.802 0.954 0.996 0.999 0.999 0.567 0.560 0.591 0.592 0.631 0.774 0.998
A 0.942 0.942 0.991 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.803 0.815 0.753 0.846 0.946 0.989 1.000
FF (LD)
R50 0.925 0.569 0.515 0.782 0.960 0.998 1.000 0.539 0.537 0.567 0.396 0.413 0.470 0.977
R18 0.949 0.657 0.668 0.890 0.987 0.999 1.000 0.633 0.637 0.654 0.472 0.536 0.663 0.994
A 0.935 0.881 0.973 0.998 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.855 0.880 0.826 0.695 0.799 0.912 1.000
FF (LT)
R50 0.926 0.592 0.413 0.616 0.902 0.992 0.999 0.437 0.428 0.501 0.357 0.330 0.363 0.965
R18 0.951 0.701 0.562 0.802 0.971 0.998 1.000 0.567 0.538 0.591 0.433 0.450 0.538 0.989
A 0.937 0.879 0.952 0.994 1.000 0.999 0.999 0.885 0.916 0.866 0.635 0.746 0.884 0.999
FF (GC)
R50 0.955 0.658 0.454 0.561 0.840 0.986 0.997 0.514 0.497 0.558 0.457 0.418 0.436 0.960
R18 0.968 0.728 0.579 0.729 0.946 0.995 0.998 0.656 0.637 0.651 0.516 0.514 0.572 0.985
A 0.969 0.887 0.928 0.994 0.999 1.000 1.000 0.902 0.915 0.875 0.728 0.794 0.898 0.999
as the least-likely class selected for the perturbations can be
semantically different from the original label. FilterFool, even
with the untargeted attack, can still mislead Top5 classes.
Table VII reports the robustness of attacks to bit reduction,
median filtering and JPEG compression. Content-based attacks
are more robust than norm-bounded attacks, as high-frequency
norm-bounded perturbations can be easily removed by these
input-based transformations. For example, the most effective
parameter of bit reduction, median smoothing and JPEG com-
pression drop the 89% success rate of SemanticAdv against
ResNet50 to 70.1%, 65.2% and 66.2%, respectively. The
reason is that SemanticAdv, similarly to other content-based
attacks such as ColorFool, generates large, low-frequency
perturbations as opposed to the high-frequency perturbations
of BIM, in which the categorical success rates drop to 52.7%,
50.9% and 38.1%, respectively. Some variants of the FilterFool
adversarial perturbations even improve the robustness of exist-
ing content-based attacks. Reducing the number of bits from
8 to 3 decreases the categorical success rate of adversarial














































Fig. 15. Robustness of norm-bounded attacks – BIM, least-likely BIM (L-
BIM), least-likely FGSM (L-FG), Private FGSM (P-FG), DeepFool (DF),
SparseFool (SF) – and content-based attacks – EdgeFool (EF), SemanticAdv
(SA), ColorFool (CF), FilterFool with Log Transformation (FF-LT), Nonlinear
detail enhancement (FF-ND), α = 1 Linear Detail Enhancement (FF-LD1),
γ = .5 Gamma correction (FF-GC.5) – whose adversarial images were
generated on ResNet50 against ResNet50 adversarially re-trained with BIM
images.
for 2 bits and 1 bit because of the quality of the resulting
images.
Finally, Figure 15 shows the categorical success rate of
adversarial images against adversarial training, when each
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training mini-batch is augmented with adversarial examples
to improve the robustness of the classifier. We use the ad-
versarially re-trained ResNet50 with BIM images [43], which
reduces the success rate of all adversarial attacks. The success
of content-based adversarial images is higher than that of
norm-bounded ones as content-based perturbations generally
have larger magnitudes. For example, the success rate of
ColorFool, SemanticAdv and FilterFool (Gamma Correction)
is above 50%. However, the success rate of norm-bounded
adversarial perturbations generated by DeepFool and FGSM
variants substantially decreases to below 20%.
VII. CONCLUSION
We proposed FilterFool, an adversarial framework that
crafts adversarial perturbations based on the content of an im-
age and on the pre-defined semantics of its label. FilterFool is
flexible and can incorporate different image filters to generate
various types of adversarial perturbations. These perturbations
are larger than those produced by norm-bounded methods,
thereby improving the transferability of the attacks to unseen
classifiers and their robustness against defences. While in this
work we considered the grouping of the labels according
to the semantic relationship defined by WordNet [24], the
framework is general and other groupings can be considered.
As future work, we will extend FilterFool to cope with multi-
label images and further image filters.
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